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DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND COURTS-MARTIAL
CONGRESS is empowered under the constitution:' "To make
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces." Under this authority, Congress has established a system
of criminal law for the regulation of members of the army and
a system of military courts for its administration. The sub-
stantive law is to be found in the Articles of War,2 other con-
gressional statutes, Army Regulations and Orders, and the cus-
toms of the service. The courts wherein this law is administered
and the procedure therein are provided for by the Articles of
War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, which is issued by
authority of the Secretary of War and has the effect of army
regulations.
The principal military courts, the courts-martial, have juris-
diction over all persons subject to military law, including not
only officers and soldiers of the army, but officers and soldiers
of the marine corps, detached for service with the army, and, in
time of war, retainers and persons accompanying or serving with
the army in the field or abroad.3 This jurisdiction is personal
rather than territorial; that is, the court-martial convened by the
proper authority and duly constituted may try a person subject
to military law for an offense made punishable by the Articles
of War, no matter where the offense is committed. A person
subject to this military jurisdiction, however, is not immune from
the territorial jurisdiction of the civil courts of the states.4 This
is recognized expressly in the Articles of War, No. 74, which
makes it obligatory upon the military authorities to deliver over
to the civil authorities offenders against the civil law.
I Art. I Sec. 8, cl. 14.
24 U. S. Compiled Stat. 1916 Chap. 5 Sec. 2308a (Rev. Stat.. 1878 Sec.
1342 as amended, by Act of August 29th, 1916, Chap. 418 Sec. 3).
3 Article of War 2.
4 Franklin v. United States, (1910) 216 U. S. 559, 54 L. Ed. 615, 30 S.
C. R. 434; Grafton v. United States, (1907) 206 U. S. 333, 51 L. Ed. 1084,
27 S. C. R. 749, 11 Ann. Cas. 640; Coleman v. Tennessee, (1878) 97 U. S.
509, 24 L. Ed. 1118.
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The Articles of War make punishable by courts-martial both
offenses of a strictly military nature and non-military offenses,"
though the capital offenses of murder and rape, committed within
the territory of the states of the Union and the District of
Columbia, are excluded from jurisdiction of courts-martial in
time of peace. 6 This concurrent jurisdiction of the civil courts
and courts-martial extends to all crimes punishable under the
criminal laws of the states where committed, with the exception
noted above.
In time of peace, as has been stated, provision is made for
turning over by the military authorities to the civil authorities
all offenders against the criminal law of the states. 7 In time of
war, such delivery by the military authorities obviously might
interfere with the efficiency of the army and is not universally re-
quired, but it appears to be the policy of the War Department to
make such delivery where the offense is of a serious character
and military exigencies do not make it inexpedient.8 In time
of peace the usual rule would probably prevail, that the court
first taking jurisdiction would be permitted to proceed without
interference by the other court having concurrent jurisdiction,
and this is implied in Article of War No. 74; but in time of
war, military exigencies require that the military authorities
should be able to demand that an offender who is subject to
military law be handed over by the civil authorities for punish-
ment, and that the military jurisdiction have priority, and this
has been recently so decided.9 There is, however, no reason why
a state court should not exercise jurisdiction over a discharged
soldier for an offense against the criminal law of the state, com-
mitted by him in time of war while a member of the army.
In such case, if the matter has already been dealt with by a
court-martial, a question of double jeopardy might arise; and,
conversely, a person who has been tried and acquitted, or con-
victed, in a civil court, might afterwards be tried by a court-
martial for the same offense and in such proceeding raise the
question of double jeopardy.
5 Articles of War 93 and 96.
a Article of War 92.
7 Article of War 74.
8 See judge Advocate General's Opinions: "Delivery of Accused Sol-dier to Civil Authorities," Oct. 30, 1917, and "Jurisdiction of Offenses by
Selective en Route to Camp," March 6, 1918.
9 (1917) Ex parte King, 246 Fed. 868.
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That no one shall twice be put in jeopardy for the same
offense is a familiar common-law doctrine. As to the federal
courts, it has the sanction of the United States constitution.'0
Many states have similar constitutional provisions and, even
without such provision, the rule against double jeopardy has been
applied by state courts as a common-law rule.1
A crime is a violation of a rule of conduct imposed by a
sovereign having the right to prescf-ibe the conduct of an individ-
ual by reason of territorial or personal jurisdiction. If a person
is subject with respect to certain conduct, at the same time, to the
jurisdiction of two sovereigns, he may, by the same act, violate the
rules of both and so commit two crimes. If -the offender is tried
and convicted, or acquitted, by one sovereign, arrd subsequently
tried by the other, it is not a case of double jeopardy, for he is
being tried by the second sovereign for a different crime. This
principle has been applied in several instances, as, for example,
where the same act is a violation of the law of two states, and
has been held to be subject to prosecution by both, without in-
volving double jeopardy.12 The same is true where the act is
an offense against the laws of a state and of the United States.13
It has also been held that no double jeopardy is involved in a
prosecution for violation of a criminal statute of a state, after
the accused has been convicted for violation of a city ordinance
framed in substantially similar terms, making punishable the
same act as did the state statute.' 4 The soundness of this latter
rule seems to be questionable, inasmuch as the city is merely a
municipal corporation established by the state, exercising dele-
gated powers, and is not itself a sovereign, but rather the agent of
the state. This rule appears to be inconsistent with the cases to
the effect that where an act violates the laws of the United States
and of a governmental agency thereof, such as the Hawaiian
10 U. S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment.
11 State v. Lee, (1894) 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110, 27 L. R. A. 498,
48 Am. St. Rep. 202.
12 Strobhar v. State, (1908) 55 Fla. 167, 47 So. 4; Marshall v. State
(1877) 6 Npb. 120, 27 Am. Rep. 363.
13 State v. Moore, (1909) 143 Iowa 240, 121 N. W. 1052, 21 Ann. Cas.
63; United States v. Cruikshank, (1875) 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588;
Moore v. Illinois, (1852) 14 How. (U.S.) 13, 14 L. Ed. 306.
14 State v. Lee, (1882) 29 Minn. 445, 13 N. W. 913; and for other cases
see 16 Corpus Juris 282.
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Islands, 5 or the Philippine Islands, 0 there would be double
jeopardy if prosecution were had by both governments, because
only one sovereign is involved, namely the United States.
In the case of an act committed by a person subject to military
law, which offends against the Articles of War or other military
law and against the criminal law of the state, would there be
double jeopardy if the offender were tried both by the courts-
martial and by the civil court of the state? There is very little
direct authority. The most important case is Grafton v. United
States." In that case a soldier was tried and acquitted by a
court-martial for violation of the then 62nd Article of War, for
killing a person in the Philippine Islands. He was later tried in
a civil court and pleaded in bar the acquittal by the court-martial.
The plea was overruled and he was convicted. He carried an
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, claiming double
jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment. The court stated the
issue as follows:
"We are next to inquire whether, having been acquitted by a
court-martial of the crime of homicide as defined by the penal
code of the Philippines, could Grafton be subjected thereafter
to trial for the same offense in a civil tribunal deriving its author-
ity, as did the court-martial, from the same government, namely,
that of the United States? That he will be punished for the
identical offense of which he has been acquitted, if the judgment
of the civil court, now before us, be affirmed, is beyond question,
because, as appears from the record, the civil court adjudged
him guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment specifically for
'an infraction of Article 404 of said Penal Code and of the crime
of homicide'."
The court decided that the plea of double jeopardy was
valid, but its opinion carefully distinguishes the principal case
from one in which the offense was an offense against the laws
of a state, using the following language:
"The same act, as held in Moore's case,'8 may constitute two
offenses, one against the United States and the other against a
state. But these things cannot be predicated of the relations
between the United States and the Philippines. The government
's United States v. Perez, 3 Hawaii Fed. 295; but see, contra, United
States v. Lee Sa Kee, 3 Hawaii Fed. 262; State v. Norman, (1898) 16
Utah 457, 52 Pac. 986.
16 Grafton v. United States, (1907) 206 U. S. 333, 51 L. Ed. 1084,
27 S. C. R. 749, 11 Ann. Cas. 640.
1" Supra.
I8 Moore v. Illinois, (1852) 14 How. (U.S.) 13, 14 L. Ed. 306.
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of a state does not derive its powers from the United States, while
the government of the Philippines owes its existence wholly to
the United States, and its judicial tribunals exert all their powers
by authority of the United States... So that the cases holding
that the same acts committed in a state of the Union may con-
stitute an offense against the United States and also a distinct
offense against the state do not apply here, where the two
tribunals that tried the accused exert all their powers under and
by authority of the same government-that of the United States."
As far as this case goes, it is not an authority to the effect
that there would be double jeopardy in a case where the laws
of a state were violated and a trial had in a state court; but in
its manner of reaching its decision and distinguishing such a case,
it is rather a strong authority that no double jeopardy would
exist.
Another authority to the same effect js In re Fair.9 In that
case a soldier who killed an escaping prisoner was tried and ac-
quitted by a court-martial and afterwards arrested for this act
on a charge of murder by a civil court of Nebraska. A proceed-
ing in habeas corpus was instituted by the accused in the federal
circuit couit and the petition was granted because the court
found that the act was done in the performance of military duty
by the accused, and therefore the release of the accused from the
jurisdiction of the state court could be obtained through this
proceeding in the federal court. The court said, however, that
trial and acquittal by the court-martial was not a bar to the inquiry
and prosecution by the proper civil authorities. A similar dictum
was expressed in the opinion in United States v. Clark.2
In State v. Rankin,2 the accused was indicted for murder
committed during the Civil War, while he was a soldier in the
Union Army. In the state court he pleaded acquittal by a gen-
eral court-martial for the same offense. The supreme court of
Tennessee held that this was not a valid plea and the case was
remanded to the trial court for trial on its merits. The opinion,
it is submitted, stated the correct doctrine-that the same act was
two distinct crimes, one against the United States and the other
against the state to whose territorial jurisdiction the offender
was subject. The authoritative value of this decision is perhaps
lessened by the fact that the prisoner could have avoided the
19 (1900) 100 Fed. 149.
20 (1887) 31 Fed. 710.
21 (1867) 4 Goldw. (Tenn.) 145.
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proceedings in the state courts at any time by habeas corpus in
the federal courts, according to Coleman v. Tennessee.2 2 In the
latter case it was held that the courts of Tennessee had no juris-
diction over offenses by soldiers in the Union Army during the
Civil War, since Tennessee was at that time not a state but an
insurgent community in military occupation, having no juris-
diction over members of the Union Army. The opinion in the
Coleman case, however, endorsed the doctrine that acquittal by a
court-martial would be no defense in a trial by a state for the
same offense.
It is provided by Article of War 40 that "No person shall
be tried a second time for the same offense." Is trial in a court-
martial, for an offense on which there have been previous proceed-
ings in a civil court, a second trial? It seems to be the opinion
of the military authorities that it is not. "Although the same
act when committed in a state might constitute two distinct
offenses, one against the United States and the other against the
state, for both of which the accused might be tried, that rule
does not apply to acts committed in the Philippine Islands.
2 3
In the case of In re Stubbs,24 (a habeas corpus proceeding in
the federal court) the petitioner had been acquitted in a civil
court on a charge of murder and was arrested and charged by
the military authorities and was about to be tried by a general
court-martial for "conduct to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline." He claimed that the surrender of his person
to the civil authorities by the military authorities for the purpose
of being tried for murder was a complete relinquishment of
military jurisdiction over the offense, so that "no other court
or special tribunal can lawfully assume jurisdiction to try the
prisoner again upon a criminal charge based upon the same facts."
The court decided against the petitioner on the ground that the
court-martial proceeding was for a distinctly military offense and
for military aspects of the act, for which there had been no trial
in the civil court, stating that "the elements constituting the
offense charged are radically different." The opinion contains
a dictum that "after having surrendered him to the civil author-
22 (1878) 97 U. S. 509, 513.
23 Manual for Courts-Martial, p. 69; see, also, to the same effect, Davis,
Military Law of the United States 534; 6 Ops. Attys. Gen. 506, 513. But
see Winthrop, Military Law 371.
24 (1905) 133 Fed. 1012.
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ities, his military superiors could not lawfully deal with the
petitioner for murder, manslaughter or criminal assault, con-
sidered as a crime against society in general." It is uncertain
whether the court means by this statement that habeas corpus
would lie had the court-martial done what this court says it
could not lawfully do. That the surrender to civil authorities is
not a waiver or final surrender of jurisdiction seems to follow
from Ex parte King.25 Even assuming that in the opinion of the
federal court the court-martial was submitting the accused to
double jeopardy, in violation of Article of War 40, it does not
seem that the prisoner would have any remedy in the civil court,
since the court-martial duly constituted by the proper authorities
has jurisdiction over the person of the accused and of the offense
of which he was charged, and assumed error by the courts-
martial in applying the law to the facts does not destroy their
jurisdiction or justify appeal to civil courts.28
Our conclusion is that where an act is an offense against
the laws of the state territorially applicable to the offender and
to his act and also against the military law to which he is per-
sonally subject, two distinct offenses are committed and there is
no double jeopardy in proceedings against him in both the civil
and military tribunals.
JUDSON A. CRANE.
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF LAW.
25 (1917) 246 Fed. 86&
26 Ex parte Tucker, (1913) 212 Fed. 569.
